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ABSTRACT. Moral Projectivism must be able to specify under what conditions a certain inner response counts as a 
moral response. I argue, however, that moral projectivists cannot coherently do so because they must assume 
that there are moral properties in the world  in order to fix the content of our moral judgements. To show 
this, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism, which is, nowadays, the most prom-
ising version of moral projectivism.  In this context, I call into question both David Lewis' dispositionalist 
account of colour and Chistine Korsgaard's procedural realism. 
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I. Normativity and unmasking explanations  
1. The individuation of a psychological state as a belief involves the satisfaction of 
some demands that are usually regarded as normative. The set of psychological states 
that constitute an agent’s beliefs are to be individuated in such a way that they tend to 
form a coherent set and track variations in the world. If, for instance, an agent be-
lieves that his watch is on the table because he can see it, then if someone removed 
the watch from the table while the agent is looking at it, then he would stop believing 
that his watch is on the table. If, in those circumstances, the agent insisted that he still 
believes that the watch is on the table, we would not take him seriously, we would just 
think that he is joking or, perhaps, trying to make a desperate philosophical point.2 
And something similar goes for the coherence requirement. 
 So, there is a first sense in which beliefs involve normativity, namely: an agent’s be-
liefs must be individuated in such a way that their coherence and truth is maximized. 
But there is also a second sense: when a particular belief is presented as true and coher-
ent with other beliefs, we are enhancing the value of that particular belief. We can thus 
say that the individuation of a belief involves normativity at least in this double sense. 
There are, however, some instances of  
  (1a) S believes that p 
where a further normative element is also present, namely, those in which the content 
of p involves some normative or evaluative concept, like in the following cases: 
  (1b) S believes that to A is morally wrong 
1 This paper has benefited from comments by participants in the Workshop on Mind and Language (Bologna, 
October 15-18, 2003), in the Weekly Seminar of the Phronesis Group and in the Seminar on Normativity 
(Granada, February 12-13, 2004). I must also thank Dan López de Sa and Marta Moreno for careful 
discussion of several aspects of this paper. 
2 Cf. Peacocke 1993; and Corbí & Prades 2000, ch. 6. 
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  (1c) S believes that to A is acting cowardly (or generously, or honestly, ...)3  
We see then that the individuation of moral judgements or beliefs involves not only 
the standard double sense of normativity, but an additional normative element that is 
present in the content of p, and this I will refer as content-normativity or content-
evaluativity.4 
2. Normativity (or evaluativity), in these three senses, seems to conflict with what natu-
ral sciences tell us about how the world is independent of us. From this viewpoint, the 
world consists of a number of causal processes which are not in themselves either co-
herent or incoherent, true or false, correct or incorrect, good or bad, generous or hon-
est, beautiful or ugly. The identity of such causal processes is assumed to be fixed in-
dependently of our research practices, and the goal of such practices is precisely to 
track such independently individuated causal processes. The world as it is independ-
ently of us contains no evaluative feature and, therefore, gives us no norm for our ac-
tion and no criteria to assess our psychological states (why should, for instance, truth 
be more valuable than falsehood?)5 Values and norms should rather be interpreted as 
part of our response to certain non-evaluative, non-normative features of the world. 
For there is no norm and no value in the world as it is independently of us.  
 This line of reasoning presupposes what we may call, according to Barry Stroud,6 
the bipartite image of our conception of the world. In that image, our conception of the 
world is the result of the combination of two independent elements: on the one hand, 
the properties of the world as it is in itself, independently of how we are and the views 
that we have about it; and, on the other hand, our psychological properties (‘inde-
pendent’ in the following sense: the identity conditions of these two elements are in-
dependently fixed), 
  CW = W + H 
where ‘CW ’, stands for ‘our conception of the world’, ‘W ’ for ‘the world as it is in it-
self’ and ‘H ’ for ‘our psychological properties’. 
3 I do not think that moral judgements are beliefs, at least in the Humean sense. Yet, for the sake of ar-
gument, I will grant that moral judgements are, prima facie, beliefs in the sense that they aim at track-
ing the world or, at least, at being correct. For my stance about this issue, cf. Corbí (ms1). 
4 Emotivists contend that moral judgements do not really express a belief with a certain normative con-
tent. I do not think, however, that emotivist can yield a satisfactory analysis of moral judgements. 
For, in my view, the same line of objection that I will develop against the moral dispositionalist, also 
applies to the emotivist. 
5 Within this framework, we could surely provide an instrumental justification for the value of truth, but 
not a justification for the value with regard to which pursuing truth is a good instrument. Besides, 
why should we value what is instrumentally valuable? 
6 Cf. Stroud 2000, ch. 1. 
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 In any case, if natural sciences have to provide a full conception of the world they 
must not only describe how the world is, independently of us, but also explain how it is 
that there are creatures in that world that have values and follow norms.7 
 The latter issue arises as soon as we acknowledge that agents have beliefs since the 
individuation of such psychological facts already involves some normative elements. 
And it may sound weird that there could be entities in the natural world that could 
only be individuated that way. There have been several attempts to bridge this particu-
lar gap between the normative and the non-normative: typically, by providing non-
normative sufficient conditions for the tokening of beliefs. This is not the problem I 
want to address in this paper. My purpose is, instead, to focus on content-normativity. 
A full conception of the world must explain how it is that there are creatures with 
content-evaluative beliefs given that there are no moral W-facts (i.e., moral facts in W) 
and, indeed, such an explanation must be carried out without assuming that there are 
such facts. According to Stroud,8 we may refer to this sort of explanation as an un-
masking explanation insofar as they aim at explaining why such beliefs are always false 
and also why, despite such a fact, agents tend to acquire them. 
3. Moral Projectivism takes the bipartite image for granted. There are different versions 
of that projectivist view, but all of them contend that moral properties are not among 
the properties of W and aim to unmaskingly explain moral beliefs. The overall projec-
tivist idea is that the external world does not include any evaluative or normative 
property and, whenever an agent is in a psychological state like (1b) and (1c), he is just 
projecting upon that world his inner response to some non-evaluative, non-normative features.9 If 
the unmasking explanation sketched by the Moral Projectivist is to succeed, he must 
be able to individuate the agent’s inner response (which allegedly constitutes the content 
projected upon the world), as well as the specific relation called ‘projection’,10 without 
relying on the existence of moral W-facts.  
7 For a discussion of the notion of an absolute conception of the world that lies behind this approach, cf. 
Nagel 1986, Putnam 1992, Stroud 2000 and Williams 1979, 1985, 2000. 
8 Cf. Stroud 2000, ch. 4. What Stroud’s line of reasoning (and mine), show is not that I must assume that p 
in order to conclude that not-p (this is not incoherent in any relevant sense), but instead that I must 
assume that p in order to fix the content of p. 
9 In principle, the inner response at issue could also be a response to some alleged evaluative or normative 
inner feature. There is, however, a crucial difference between the fact that I value p (this is just a psy-
chological fact) and the fact that p (even if p is a psychological fact) is valuable. For the Projectivist 
there are not facts of the latter kind except in the sense that facts of the former kind satisfy some in-
dependent principles or constraints. 
10 Apparently, Dispositionalist Theories do not need to talk of projection. Once we understand that 
moral properties are response-dependent properties, we needn’t claim that these are properties of ac-
tions or situations in a response-independent way. But, still, Dispositionalist Theorist must accept 
that, before being supposedly convinced by their account, people used to believe that moral proper-
ties were response-independent and, therefore, such a theorist must account for the content of such 
beliefs and, at this stage, what else but projection could do the job for them? 
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 In the coming sections, I will argue that moral projectivism cannot be coherently 
thought, that moral projectivists must assume that there are moral properties in the 
world (in the sense of the bipartite image, which is the only one available to them) in 
order to fix the content of the moral judgements that figure within our conception of 
the world. 
 It does not follow that, in order to defend a realist stance, I must assume that moral 
properties exist in the world in the sense defined by the bipartite image. For I regard 
my line of argument as a reductio of that image. For someone who is trapped in that 
image, the only alternative to moral projectivism is moral realism construed as claim-
ing that moral properties are properties of the world in the sense fixed by the bipartite 
image, that is, as properties of W. But, once that image is dropped, the claims of the 
moral realist must be interpreted differently.  
 The structure of this paper goes as follows. As we have seen, the Moral Projectivist 
must be able to specify under what conditions a certain inner response counts as a 
moral response. I intend to argue that a proper elucidation of such conditions will call 
into question the possibility of coherently reaching a moral projectivist stance. To this 
purpose, I will initially focus on what I judge to be the most promising version of 
moral projectivism, namely, moral dispositionalism. In this respect, I will, firstly, dis-
tinguish between the individuating conditions of two features, namely, ‘being nauseat-
ing’ and ‘being humiliating’. Secondly, I will challenge David Lewis’ dispositionalist 
account of colour and argue that moral dispositionalism faces the same difficulties as 
Lewis’ approach.11 In the two last sections, I will present Korsgaard’s procedural real-
ism as a failed attempt to overcome those worries.  
II. Troubles with Moral Dispositionalism 
5. The individuation of moral features must meet some constraints which, features like 
‘being nauseating’ or ‘being frightening’ need not. And such constraints have to do 
with the sort of limit that Isaiah Berlin detects regarding what may count as a different 
value: 
“Forms of life differ. Ends, moral principles, are many. But not indefinitely many: they must be 
within the human horizon. If they are not, they are outside the human sphere. If I find men who 
 
This is quite clear in the case of colour terms (and, something similar, goes for moral terms). For the fact 
that colour properties are just secondary is just known a posteriori, it depends on the truth of a certain 
conception of the world. Hence such a fact cannot form a part of the content of the belief before 
that conception of the world arose. It might form a part of the content of such beliefs that colours 
could be secondary properties, but this holds for shape beliefs as well. 
How does the Dispositionalist individuation of the content of our colour or axiological beliefs relate to 
the content of such beliefs before the disenchanted conception of the world? It does not sound like 
an analysis of such content for the reasons I have mentioned. Perhaps, it should be expressed like 
this: the most we can retain of the old beliefs. How is this continuum individuated? Some reasons can 
be mentioned, but, in the end, what matters is the perception of the continuum itself. 
11 I have elaborated this point in discussion with D. López de Sa (cf. López de Sa 2003) and Marta Mo-
reno. 
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worship trees, not because they are symbols of fertility or because they are divine, with a mysteri-
ous life and powers of their own, or because this grove is sacred to Athena —but only because 
they are made of wood; and if when I ask them why they worship wood they say ‘Because it is 
wood’ and give no other answer; then I do not know what they mean. If they are human, they are 
not beings with whom I can communicate —there is a real barrier. They are not human for me. I 
cannot even call their values subjective if I cannot conceive what it would be like to pursue such 
a life.”12 
I will use Berlin’s quotation to compare the conditions under which an object or ac-
tion can be identified as red, humiliating, or nauseating. 
 It is clear that the property ‘being nauseating’ is quite flexible regarding variations 
both in the object that may be identified as nauseating and in the subject that may have 
the suitable experience. For not only could any object be nauseating to some particular 
sensitive being, but also it is perfectly intelligible (even if rare) that a given object may 
be nauseating to that being on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, but not the rest of 
the week. In other words, the identification of an object as nauseating for someone 
does not require a certain future or past pattern of response on their side. The deep 
grammar of nauseating is ‘being nauseating for someone at some moment’. 
 But this is not so for the property ‘being humiliating’. It is true that, for any par-
ticular action that we now judge humiliating, we may imagine situations in which we 
would not deem it such or people who would not regard it as humiliating even in the 
present conditions. The problem is that to understand these variations we need some 
sort of explanation, a narrative. For instance, we cannot simply say that carrying the 
Star of David is humiliating whereas carrying the swastika is not. We need further de-
tails, we need to know that, even if the Star of David is a Jewish symbol, the fact that 
the Nazis imposed it as a stigma made the act of carrying it humiliating. But, of 
course, we can easily work out a context in which someone is proud of carrying the 
Star of David and ashamed of wearing the swastika.13 
 This suggests a significant flexibility as to what particular actions may be humiliat-
ing. Still, to render that flexibility intelligible, we need to tell a story that connects such 
actions to some morally relevant facts. This constraint is, nevertheless, absent in the 
case ‘being nauseating’: variations are not constrained by the availability of any such 
story.14  
 Constraints also apply to the sort of flexibility that can be tolerated regarding the 
nature of a moral subject. It is true that Germans Jews might have found it humiliating 
to carry the Star of David every day except the Sabbath, but to understand that, we 
need to tell a story: suppose, for instance, that it were part of the Jewish tradition to 
12 Berlin 1958, p. 11-12. 
13 “... a long time ago, while the first intifada was still taking place, it dawned on me that Israel was run by 
people who carried the David’s Star is if it was a swastika” (a Palestinian journalist). 
14 This doesn’t mean that there is no constraint involved. Presumably, some patterns of regularity are re-
quired, but not the kind of story pointed out in the case of humiliating: variations in the latter case 
must be justified in terms of variations of some morally relevant features, and nothing similar is in-
volved in the individuation of nauseating. 
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carry the Star of David on the Sabbath but the rest of the days it was forbidden. So, an 
action cannot coherently be individuated as humiliating if the alleged individuating re-
sponse on the side of the subjects were allowed to vary arbitrarily, like, for instance, 
the nauseating response it allowed. Variations on the side of the subject, like on the 
side of the object, must be justified in terms of variations of some morally relevant features. 
6. The previous considerations allow us to distinguish between moral pluralism and 
moral relativism. The latter would affirm that moral properties are as flexible as being 
nauseating is, while the former would deny that, and would allow moral properties the 
sort of constrained flexibility that I have just ascribed to being humiliating. It is in the 
light of this distinction, that I interpret Berlin’s claim that the conceptual inevitability 
of the conflict of values (about which we will talk later on) entail a healthy pluralism 
but not wild relativism.  
 I must also say that the constraints upon the flexibility of our moral responses are 
quite naturally expressed in terms of what the morally relevant features of the situation 
are. To put it another way, the individuation of a response as the humiliating response, 
quite naturally appeals to the attribution to the action (and not to the response) of 
some other moral features. And this fact seems to favour a realist interpretation of such 
features and, in the end, of ‘being humiliating’.  
 The Moral Projectivist might certainly retort that the distinction I have just drawn 
between ‘being nauseating’ and ‘being humiliating’ is insufficient to make of the latter 
a real, objective feature of an action. For I have acknowledged that any particular action 
that is presently perceived as humiliating, may be regarded in some other context as 
not so or even as enhancing one’s pride. Hence, even if our pre-theoretical conception 
of moral terms involves attributing them to actions, the individuation of any such fea-
tures does not escape the logic of response-dependent features. In any event, the 
Moral Projectivist must be able to fix the content of our moral beliefs without assum-
ing that there are moral features in W, but I do not think that such a demand can be 
met. To this end, I intend to challenge what I take to be the most promising attempt 
to meet that demand, namely: moral dispositionalism.  
7. Moral dispositionalism claims that the moral features of actions are response-
dependent properties, so that ‘being humiliating’ has two different, but closely inter-
connected, meanings. As a property of actions, ‘being humiliating’ alludes to the ca-
pacity of certain actions or situations to provoke, under certain circumstances, a spe-
cific inner response in some sort of agents. But ‘being humiliating’ may also refer to 
the specific inner response that figures in the previous characterization. The crucial 
question is whether these two interconnected meanings of ‘being humiliating’ can be 
individuated without assuming that actions and situations may be humiliating in a real-
ist sense. My conclusion will be that they cannot. To develop the discussion, I will ini-
tially focus on colour properties and, in particular, on the dispositionalist analysis of 
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such properties that David Lewis proposes in ‘Naming colors’.15 Quite naturally, 
Lewis begins by characterizing both red and the experience of red as follows: 
(7a) “Red is the surface property of things which typically causes experiences of red 
in people who have such things before the eyes. 
(7b) Experience of red is the inner state of people which is the typical effect of having 
red things before the eyes.”16 
And he quite straightforwardly acknowledges that this “pair of definitions are almost 
totally useless, by reason of circularity.”17 He also accepts that Carnap’s manoeuvre to 
avoid circularity in terms of Ramsey sentence, is insufficient because it does not allow 
us to distinguish between red and yellow, and between the experience of red and the 
experience of yellow. To solve this problem, we need, as Lewis points out, some fur-
ther claims like the following ones: 
(7c) ‘Red is the colour of pillar box’ 
(7d) “... A living instrument: magenta is the colour such that I am disposed to say 
‘magenta’ if you point to it and ask ‘What colour is that?’”18 
Lewis raises some worries concerning the parochialism of (7c) which I will not con-
sider here. Suppose then that  
the combination of facts (7a), (7b), and some (7c)-like and (7d)-like facts fix the 
properties red and experience of red. 
Yet, the need to introduce (7c)-like facts in order to distinguish between red and yel-
low, seem to have some serious implications. Prima facie, (7c)-like facts ascribe colour 
features to objects in the world without mentioning any response on the side of the 
perceiver. Of course, the dispositionalist could reply that such ascriptions should be 
interpreted in the light of (7a). But, recall, (7c)-like facts were introduced to add some 
further content to (7a) and (7b), whereby the content of an (7c)-like fact cannot then 
reduce to 
(7a*) A pillar box has the property of being an object whose surface typically 
causes experiences of red in people who have such things before the eyes. 
(7b*) Experience of red is the inner state of people which is the typical effect of hav-
ing a pillar box before the eyes. 
For, otherwise, there is no way in which the fact that a pillar box is red and not yellow 
could have been established, since we would be stuck with the same sort of emptiness 
15 Cf. Lewis 1997. 
16 Lewis 1997, p. 327. I am leaving aside other worries as to how to express these biconditionals in such a 
way that they are true of colours and not of shapes. Cf., in this respect, García-Carpintero 2002; Pettit 
1991; Johnston 1989, 1992, 1993, 1998; Stroud 2000; Wedgwood 1998; and Wright 2001.  
17 Lewis 1997, p. 327. 
18 Lewis 1997, p. 336. 
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that led Lewis to add (7c)-like and (7d)-like facts in the first place. Hence, it seems that 
if Lewis’ manoeuvre is to be successful, then (7c)-like statements must possess some 
additional content, they cannot only be interpreted in the light of (7a) and (7b). To put it 
another way, the sense in which the claim that pillar boxes are red cannot be reduced 
to the truth of the response-dependent biconditional implicit in (7a). 
 Alternatively, suppose (7c) is construed as an example of a red object whose role it 
is to contribute to fixing the property which ‘red’ refers to. Let us then reflect on the 
conditions under which a pillar box can play such a role. First of all, at least as it 
stands, (7c) involves the previous mastery of the concept of colour, that a pillar box 
can only help to fix the content of ‘red’ if the concept of ‘colour’ has already been 
fixed. To be consistent, the dispositionalist ought to provide a response-dependent 
account of the concept of ‘colour’ itself and it is uncertain how this could be done. 
Secondly, it is clear that if pillar boxes are to be used as examples that help us to grasp 
a certain concept (or to fix a certain property), then our capacity to grasp the colour of 
a pillar box cannot be reduced to our capacity to grasp the truth (7a) plus the claim 
that a pillar box satisfies the definition of ‘red’ in (7a), since, as we have seen, this 
definition does not tell us whether the object is red or yellow, whereby if the only fact 
that we grasp is that a pillar box satisfies that fact, we are not yet grasping that a pillar 
box is red. The colour of a pillar box can only be used as an example to fix the con-
tent of ‘red’ if, in grasping the colour of that object, we grasp something more than its 
capacity to satisfy the disposition specified in (7a). It seems that what we grasp is that 
pillar boxes are red and not yellow, and that this fact cannot be apprehended by the 
response-dependent biconditional, but, the other way round, that such biconditionals 
only characterize colour properties if they presuppose our capacity to grasp some in-
dependent facts like the ones I have just mentioned. 
 And this seems enough to challenge a response-dependent approach to colours, 
insofar as such an approach claims that colours are merely response-dependent proper-
ties, namely, that the sense in which an object has a colour is exhausted by (7a). I must, 
finally, stress that, even if my line of reasoning were right, this would not show that 
response-dependent theorists are wrong, but only that one cannot coherently reach 
that stance.19 
8. It is easy to see how the previous line of reasoning applies to ‘being humiliating’. 
Suppose we (provisionally and quite clumsily) reconstruct the biconditionals concern-
ing humiliating and feeling humiliated as follows 
19 At this stage, I am adopting the sort stance that Barry Stroud defends with regard to subjectivism about 
colours and even about scepticism with regard to the external world. 
By the way, I do not think (7d) may come to our help unless we assume that intentionality can be natural-
ized or that inner experiences can be individuated independently of (7b). Yet, if we could assume 
that, then there is no need to appeal to (7b) and therefore Lewis’ would be irrelevant. 
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(8a) Humiliating is an action that typically causes feelings of humiliation in the per-
son (or persons) to whom it is directed.20 
(8b) A feeling of humiliation is the inner state of people which is the typical effect of 
humiliating actions. 
It quite obvious that this pair of definitions and the corresponding Ramsey sentence, 
is insufficient to distinguish humiliating from shameful or coward.21 To solve this 
problem, we need some further claims like the following ones: 
(8c) Humiliating is being a Jew and being forced to carry the Star of David under 
the Nazi regime. 
(8d) A living instrument: humiliating is the action such that I am disposed to say 
‘yes’ if you point to it and ask ‘Is this action humiliating?’ 
Like in the colour case, the sense in which (8c) claims that it was humiliating that the 
Jews had to carry the Star of David, cannot reduce the truth of the response-
dependent biconditional implicit in (8a). For then (8a) we would be prey to the same 
accusation of emptiness that led Lewis to posit (8c), and then we could no longer dis-
tinguish between an action being humiliating, shameful or cowardly. 
 And this seems enough to challenge a response-dependent treatment of thick 
moral properties, insofar as such a treatment claims that such properties are merely re-
sponse-dependent properties, namely, that the sense in which an object has a colour 
or a thick moral property is exhausted by (8a) and (8a), respectively.22 Once again, even 
if my line of reasoning is right, this will not show that such theorists are wrong, but 
only that one cannot coherently reach that stance. 
 This worry does not arise regarding ‘being nauseating’ precisely because such a 
property is not constrained by the sort of demand that the individuation of an action 
as humiliating involves. Undoubtedly, some patterns of regularity must be present in or-
der to individuate an object as nauseating. The crucial question is if such patterns nec-
essarily involve the ascription to the object of features of the same kind that we are 
trying to individuate (or, in other word, if some (7c)-like facts are necessarily required). 
The sort of variability that is allowed for nauseating reveals that the patterns of regu-
larity required for its individuation, do not involve such an ascription and this is the 
reason why they are uncontroversially regarded as subjective. My conclusion is that 
precisely because such an ascription is unavoidable in the case of red and humiliating, 
20 I am leaving aside here the sense in which an action may be humiliating not because the agent who per-
forms it feels humiliated but, on the contrary, because it is performed in order to cause such feelings 
in other people. 
21 I think that Lewis’ dispositional theory of value cannot help in this respect. Even if we assume that 
“Something of the appropriate category is a value if and only if we would be disposed, under ideal conditions, to value 
it”(Lewis 1989, p. 68); this does not tell us how to distinguish aesthetical from moral values, that an 
action is humiliating instead of shameful, and so on. 
22 If I am right, then, even though in the case of secondary properties, response-dependent biconditionals 
were true in virtue of the essence of such properties, they do not exhaust their essence. 
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we cannot coherently think of them as subjective, as merely response-dependent or, in 
other words, that, in the process of fixing those concepts, we must at some stage as-
sume that there are colour and moral facts that are independent of our response. Let 
us examine Korsgaard’s procedural realism and show why this projectivist approach 
does not escape the overall worries that I have raised against moral dispositionalism. 
III. A challenge to Korsgaard’s Procedural Realism 
9. There are several texts where Korsgaard clearly endorses moral projectivism. In her 
view, the content that our moral judgements project upon consists of the content of 
those of our impulses that pass a certain normativity test: 
“Morality is grounded in human nature. Obligations and values are projections of our own moral 
sentiments and dispositions... Each impulse as it offers itself to the will must pass a kind of test 
for normativity before we can adopt it as a reason for action. But the test it must pass is not the 
test of knowledge or truth. For Kant, like for Hume and Williams, thinks that morality is 
grounded in human nature, and that moral properties are projections of human dispositions. So 
the test is one of reflective endorsement.”23 
As it stands, it seems that the content of our impulses, of our human dispositions, is 
fixed independently of the fact that they pass or fail to pass the normativity test. After 
all, the normativity test must be applied to a content that is previously fixed. In any 
case, Korsgaard takes it that the content of a human disposition is moral if and only if 
it passes a certain normativity test, even though no moral notion is required to fix the 
content itself. As we shall see, she proposes the moral law as the key normative test 
that an impulse must pass in order to be regarded as moral. And her distinction be-
tween private and public reasons, as well as her notion of unification, might be con-
strued as attempts to elucidate the precise content of the moral law, even if they were 
initially designed to ground the need to be moral. 
10. If Korsgaard’s strategy succeeded, she would be able to retain both the projectivist 
idea that moral properties are not features of W and the normativity of moral judge-
ments. This intuition can also be expressed, as Korsgaard does, by distinguishing two 
kinds of moral realism: 
“The procedural moral realist thinks that there are answers to moral questions because there are 
correct procedures for arriving at them. But the substantive moral realist thinks that there are 
correct procedures for answering moral questions because there are moral truths or facts which ex-
ist independently of those procedures, and which those procedures track.”24 
23 Korsgaard 1996, p. 91, italics are mine. See also: “The reflective endorsement method has its natural 
home in theories that reject realism and ground morality in human nature... They [the sentimentalists] 
explicitly rejected the realism of the rationalists, and argued that the moral value of actions and ob-
jects is a projection of human sentiments.” (Korsgaard 1996, p. 50.) 
24 Korsgaard 1996, pp. 36-7. Similarly, she claims that “Procedural moral realism is the view that there are 
answers to moral questions; that is, that there are right and wrong ways to answer them. Substantive 
moral realism is the view that there are answers to moral questions because there are moral facts or 
truths.” (Korsgaard 1996, p. 35.) 
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As it stands, this distinction between procedural and substantive moral realism may be 
regarded as trivially circular. For, in this quotation, ‘substantive moral facts’ are char-
acterized as facts that are independent of any such procedures, while ‘a procedure’ is 
tacitly individuated as a deliberation process that does not appeal to any substantive 
moral facts. Obviously, in order to track the intuitions that lie behind projectivism, we 
need a stronger notion of ‘procedure’, we must impose some constraints upon the 
sort of fact to which a procedure appeals, even if in the quotation itself, no such con-
straint has been explicitly imposed. For, in the quoted text, substantive facts are just 
those that are not mentioned within the procedure and no constraint is mentioned 
about what sort of fact may figure within a procedure. To avoid this circularity, a pro-
jectivist constraint comes quite naturally to our minds: substantive facts are facts 
about W and a procedure cannot rely on the attribution of moral facts to W if it has to 
help us to individuate the projected moral content within the boundaries of projectiv-
ism. Thus, I propose to read the previous quotation as tacitly appealing to this con-
ception of a procedure and the corresponding notion substantive facts. So, we can say 
Procedural moral realism (hereafter, ‘procedural realism’) allows for the existence of 
right and wrong answers to moral issues, but claims that such answers are 
determined by some procedures that, in their application, do not involve the 
appeal to any moral facts to W and whose legitimacy does not derive from 
their ability to track any such facts.  
Substantive moral realism (hereafter, ‘substantive realism’) claims that any procedure 
that might fix the right answer to a moral issue must appeal, at some stage, to 
moral facts in the world.  
Notice that, to avoid emptiness, procedural realism has been characterized by relying 
on projectivism and the associated bipartite image of our conception of the world; 
whereas substantive realism is not so committed. So, that someone (like myself) could 
endorse substantive realism without understanding the attribution of moral properties 
to the world as the attribution of such properties to W. But, indeed, a projectivist (like 
Korsgaard herself) must understand such substantive moral facts as W-facts. This is 
why we may call the substantive realism to which she opposes, substantive W-realism. 
 Quite reasonably, Korsgaard thinks that she has good reason to reject substantive 
W-realism and this is why she is interested in defending procedural realism. I will ar-
gue, however, that only if we assume substantive realism, can we make sense of moral 
discourse or, more precisely, can the content of moral judgements be fixed. Following 
up from my previous remarks on moral dispositionalism, I will conclude that a projec-
tivist, insofar as she is committed to the bipartite image, must assume substantive W-
realism in order to make sense of moral discourse. A first consequence of this will be 
that procedural realism falls short of grasping the content of our moral judgements. A 
second implication is that, insofar substantive W-realism is utterly implausible, this 
may be regarded as reductio against projectivism and the associated bipartite image. An 
alternative picture of our conception of the world will emerge out of Korsgaard’s vin-
dication of the space of public reasons as the bedrock upon which moral experiences 
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and judgements are elaborated. I am quite sympathetic with this alternative approach, 
but, in my view, it clashes with Korsgaard’s projectivism and her defence of proce-
dural realism. But let us begin by exploring Korsgaard’s procedural proposal. 
11. Korsgaard distinguishes between the categorical imperative and the moral law: 
“Now I’m going to make a distinction that Kant doesn’t make. I am going to call the law of act-
ing only on maxims you can will be laws ‘the categorical imperative’. And I am going to distin-
guish it from what I will call ‘the moral law’. The moral law, in the Kantian system, is the law of 
what Kant calls the Kingdom of Ends, the republic of all rational beings. The moral law tells us 
to act only on maxims that all rational beings could agree to act on together in a workable coopera-
tive system.”25 
 In this view, the only constraint that the categorical imperative imposes is that the 
agent must choose a law, that the choice of a free will must have “the form of a 
law”.26 By contrast, the moral law involves a more stringent demand on what may 
count as a universal law, namely, one must take into consideration not only one’s own 
will but that of other people. Korsgaard seeks to ground morality (that is, provide a 
response to ‘Why should I be moral?’) by showing, first, that the categorical imperati-
ve is constitutive of action; second, that the moral law is constitutive of interaction 
and, thirdly, that the agent’s actions involve the interaction of his parts. It follows then 
that the moral law is also constitutive of action. Leaving aside Korsgaard’s foundatio-
nal project, I want to focus on her attempt to fix the content of the moral law and ar-
gue that she cannot fix it without assuming that there are moral W-facts.  
12. Korsgaard’s distinction between public and private reason, as well as the notion of 
unification, play a crucial role in her foundational project, but also in her attempt to 
determine the content of the moral law, to fix what may count as a law that can (mor-
ally) be willed to be universal. In the latter respect, we might say that Korsgaard must 
provide an account of the modality of that ‘can’ which, despite avoiding any moral W-
facts, tracks our intuitions about what counts as a moral maxim.  
 Let us begin with the distinction between private and public reasons. Consider, fo-
llowing up Korsgaard’s own example, that a lecturer and a student are trying to arran-
ge an appointment. Suppose that the lecturer proposes to meet in the afternoon but 
the student replies that, at that time, he has a class. The lecturer may treat the stu-
dent’s remark just as a reason for him, as a sheer obstacle to have an appointment that 
afternoon, or, alternatively, she could acknowledge the normative force of the stu-
dent’s reason and includes it in a cooperative search of a time that might be conve-
nient for both of them. Korsgaard claims that, in the latter case, the lecture regards the 
student’s reason as a public reason, while, in the former one, the student’s reason is trea-
ted just as a private one. 
25 Korsgaard 1996, p. 99, italics are mine. 
26 Korsgaard 1996, p. 98. 
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 But what are the implications of this distinction for the modality of ‘can’ in the 
moral law? The overall intuition is that the modality of ‘can’ must be constrained by 
public reasons in at least two senses: 
(C1) one can will a law to become universal only if the normative force of other 
people’s reasons have been acknowledged, that is, only if their reasons have 
been treated as public reasons. And 
(C2) it is only the law that comes out of assessing all these public reasons that one 
can will to become a universal law.  
The content of the moral law is thus fixed by applying constraints (C1) and (C2) to the 
modality of ‘can’. Such constraints involve that the moral agent treat other people’s 
reasons as public, as having a normative force in a process of cooperative deliberation. 
My question is: how is it fixed the fact that such an acknowledgement has taken pla-
ced? I do not see how this could be done but by examining how that moral agent de-
liberates on particular issues, the relative weight that he attaches to different reasons, 
the particular decisions that he makes, the way he acts. In other words, I think we 
would need to consider the content of the reasons at stake and see whether he is gi-
ving them the appropriate weight. For instance, we could not say that the lecturer is 
treating the student’s reasons as public if a trifling inconvenience on the former’s side 
would overweight a most serious problem for the student. In that case, the lecturer 
would fail to acknowledge the normativity of the student’s reasons, but this verdict 
couldn’t be reached independently of the assessement of the student’s reason. The 
moral law must then rely on some independent means to assess the normative force of a 
reason and determine whether the moral agent have really taken it into consideration 
in his process of deliberation or, to put it another way, whether moral agents are really 
involved in a process of cooperative deliberation, in a real process of interaction.27 
 It is easy to see, however, that those independent means must, inevitably appeal to 
substantive moral facts. Suppose, for instance, that the student’s reason includes some 
moral thick concept like ‘being humiliating’. How could the content of that reason be 
specified? I do not think that such a content can be fixed within the boundaries of 
projectivism and, to this effect, we have already seen the most promising projectivist 
27 One may be tempted to appeal, at this stage, to the notion of agreement and claim that we can will a law 
to become universal if we all agree on accepting that law (cf. Korsgaard 1996, p. 99). This proposal has 
the advantage that agreement can still be regarded as a merely procedural criterion, but it also con-
fronts a number of serious difficulties. Firstly, not every actual agreement will do, but only those 
agreements that satisfy some normative criteria and the procedural realist is committed to provide 
some merely procedural criteria to distinguish relevant from irrelevant agreements, but, as we have 
seen, Korsgaard’s argument for public reasons can hardly help in this respect. Secondly, it is obvious 
that such an agreement will only be relevant if it is achieved after an appropriate process of delibera-
tion, but how would the agents deliberate? how would they assess the different public reasons? and, 
more importantly, what will the content of such reasons be? Of course, the content of the claim ‘Wear-
ing the Star of David is humiliating’ cannot be ‘we agree that wearing the Star of David is humiliating’ 
if there are no independent means to fix the content upon which we agree. 
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account (namely, moral dispositionalism) fails, that projectivists cannot fix the content 
of the property ‘being humiliating’ without assuming that it is a property of W. 
13. Korsgaard’s notion of a unified agent will not be of much avail either. For, if we 
construe that notion in merely formal terms, there are many ways in which an agent 
may be unified28 which we (Korsgaard included) would like to discard as a criterion of 
what counts as a moral response. Consider for instance, the tyrannical person who is 
obsessed with a particular goal in detriment of other parts of himself. If, on the con-
trary, we adopt a more demanding notion of unification, like Korsgaard does, so that 
only those agents that are unified in certain ways give rise to moral responses, then 
Korsgaard needs some further procedural criteria to fix those particular ways. Her 
proposal is that, in the privileged sort of unification, 
“... reason must rule in the soul, if the soul is to be capable of action, and it must rule according 
to its own principle, if the action is to be a good one, and not defective.”29  
This is, indeed, the case of the aristocratic person. My worry is again whether Kors-
gaard supplies any procedure to fix the fact that reason rules in the soul and rules ac-
cording to its own principle. The procedures that she actually mentions goes back to 
the distinction between public and private reasons, so that the aristocratic person ta-
kes into account the claims of all her parts and does not discard any such claims as 
merely private. Moreover, Korsgaard argues that the person who is aristocratic, who is 
inwardly just, will also be outwardly just, will supposedly take other people’s reasons 
into account. No matter what you think of this last transition, it is clear that Kors-
gaard’s approach is still affected by my remarks in the preceding sections.  
IV. Moral Projectivism and the space of public reasons 
14. So far, I have tried to show that Korsgaard’s procedural realism sinks insofar as it 
is construed as part of a projectivist approach. The main reason is that there is no way 
in which the content of our moral judgements and reasons could be fixed without as-
suming the existence of some substantive moral facts, which a projectivist must inter-
pret as W-facts. This becomes particularly clear when we realize that the morality of a 
maxim, its ability to pass the normativity test of the moral law, must rely on some in-
dependent means to fix the normative force of a reason and, in the case of reasons 
whose content involve thick moral concepts, such means inevitably comprise of the 
reference to some substantive moral facts. Of course, I am not thereby denying that 
the moral law apprehends the form of all moral maxims, but just that it could help to 
carry on the project of the procedural realist. And here we come to the second ten-
sion, within Korsgaard’s approach: the tension between her projectivism and a crucial 
step in her attempt to ground morality, namely, the claim that our being naturally 
28 “The tyrannical soul, as I’ve just said, is consistently ruled and unified, though it is not self-governed.” 
(Korsgaard 2002, lec. V, p. 25.) 
29 Korsgaard 2002, lec. VI, p. 1. 
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placed in the space of public reasons is the bedrock of moral experiences and judge-
ments. 
15. Traditional moral philosophers tend to think that the task of grounding morality 
consists in showing why an agent has private reasons to take other people’s private 
reasons into account30 and, therefore, to acknowledge their normative force and treat 
them as public reasons. I will not discuss the different attempts to go from private to 
public reasons in order to ground morality, since (I agree with Korsgaard) all such at-
tempts fail,31 but just challenge the plausibility of her alternative approach if it is to be 
interpreted within the boundaries of procedural realism. Her alternative view rests on 
the following intuition:  
“The solution to these problems must be to show that reasons are not private, but public in their 
very essence.”32  
To put it another way, we needn’t have private reasons to place ourselves within the 
space of public reasons; since the latter is a space that we naturally inhabit: 
“You can no more take the reasons of another to be mere pressure than you can take the lan-
guage of another to be mere noise.” (Korsgaard 1996, p. 143.) 
and, similarly,  
“Human beings are social animals in a deep way. It is not just that we go for friendship or prefer 
to live in swarms or packs. The space of linguistic consciousness —the space in which meanings 
and reasons exist— is a space that we occupy together.” (Korsgaard 1996, p. 145.) 
As Korsgaard points out, substantive realism has no trouble in acknowledging the ex-
istence of public reason, of reasons whose normative force must not derive from 
some independent private reasons. For this realist stance assumes that there are objec-
tive moral facts, that is, facts that are objective features of a public world. But, as we 
know, Korsgaard wants to avoid substantive realism (which, given her projectivism, 
must be identified as substantive W-realism) because she thinks that it is plagued with 
difficulties, whereby she proposes to construe “publicity as shareability”.33 Although, 
in contrast with the traditional view, she insists that we needn’t have any independent 
reason to share other people’s reasons, to acknowledge the normative force of such 
30 “What such neo-Kantian arguments... and the Hobbesian arguments have in common is this: both as-
sume that an individual agent has private reasons, that is, reasons that have normative force for her, 
and they try to argue that those private reasons give the individual some reason to take the (private) 
reasons of other people into account.” (Korsgaard 1996, p. 133) 
31 “All of these objections have something in common. They are all ways of saying that private reasons 
will remain forever private, that the gap from private reasons to public ones cannot be bridged by ar-
gument. In one sense, this is just what we should expect. We cannot know what an argument does un-
til after we know whether the reasons it employs are private or public.” (Korsgaard 1996, p. 134.) 
32 Korsgaard 1996, p. 135. 
33 Korsgaard 1996, p. 135. 
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reasons because that is our natural attitude towards them. Korsgaard appeals to Witt-
genstein’s private language argument to support the latter claim.34  
 I see, however, a deep tension between Korsgaard’s projectivism and her claim 
that our position in the space of public reasons is the bedrock upon which moral 
judgements and experiences are elaborated. To unveil that tension, let us first ask what 
sort of fact is the fact F, i.e., the fact that an agent is placed in the space of public rea-
sons.  
 According to the projectivist, F is either a fact about W or about H. Of course, the 
projectivist could not admit that it is a fact about W because, according to her, there 
are no normative facts in W. But, on the other hand, I will argue that Korsgaard can-
not coherently claim that F is a fact about H.  
16. Part of what Wittgenstein’s analysis of rule following shows, is that no fact about 
H fixes the meaning of words, that there is no way in which facts about H may fix the 
distinction between following a rule correctly or incorrectly, that, in order to make 
sense of meaning, we must go beyond H and assume that we are already placed in the 
linguistic space. In other words, linguistic facts cannot be derived from any facts either 
about H or about W. And something similar goes from any other normative facts, like 
the fact that other people’s reasons have normative force. This is, indeed, the reading 
of Wittgenstein’s analysis on which Korsgaard relies in order to claim that we are 
naturally placed in the space of public reasons, that there is no need (and no possibil-
ity) of going from private reasons (which might belong to H) to public reasons. 
 To avoid some misunderstanding, let us point out that, when an agent stands in 
the space of public reasons, the content of his thought could not be rightly character-
ized as  
  (i) ‘I take reason R of agent A as having normative force N ’,35 
which is a fact with no normative import, but as 
  (ii) ‘Reason R of agent A has normative force N ’. 
Wittgenstein’s and Korsgaard’s point could then be expressed as follows: 
A negative claim: (ii)-like facts do not reduce to (i)-like facts, and 
A positive claim: (ii)-like facts are the bedrock upon which moral experiences and 
judgements grow.  
And my challenge to moral dispositionalism (and, in the end, to procedural realism) 
should be construed as an argument that backs up the negative claim, and suggests the 
positive one.  
34 Cf. Korsgaard 1996, pp. 136-138. 
35 The same goes for ‘We take other people’s reasons as having normative force’, insofar as ‘we’ refers to 
a set of individuals. 
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17. Yet, if this turns out to be so, if fact F is neither a W-fact nor an H-fact, then 
Korsgaard should either give up the bipartite image (and, thereby, projectivism) be-
cause there is no room within it for what she claims to be the bedrock of morality (i.e., 
fact F); or, on the contrary, give up fact F. Suppose we give up the bipartite image 
(which is the option that I favour for reasons that I have not mentioned here)36 then 
what room can we make for F and any other facts that can be elaborated out of F? 
Well, once we give up the image of our conception of the world that led us to claim 
that, appearances to the contrary, the world has no moral features; we could just go 
back to our previous view and claim that both the meaning of words and moral facts 
are facts of the world (the world, which is to be distinguished from W, insofar as my 
description of the world is not committed to the bipartite image). In fact, we have no 
other option if my argument against moral dispositionalism is correct, if the content 
of thick moral concepts cannot be fixed except by assuming that the world has moral 
properties.  
 Of course, moral facts, like meanings, would not exist if creatures with a certain 
form of life would not exist, but this circumstance by itself does not render moral 
facts more subjective (where ‘subjective’ here no longer means ‘pertaining to H ’) than 
meanings themselves. Needless to say, fact F itself, like the overall fact that words 
have meanings, is not properly speaking a fact of the world, but a fact that sets one of 
the boundaries of the world. In any case, once more we must recall that this is no 
more than a transcendental argument, that the result is simply that if we want to make 
sense of language and morality, we must give up the bipartite image and assume that 
meanings and moral features belong to the world (which, of course, is not W).  
18. To recapitulate, I must say that, in my case against Korsgaard’s procedural realism, 
I have pointed out two problems: (1) There is no way in which her appeal to the 
moral law, the distinction between private and public reasons, and the notion of unifi-
cation, may allow us to coherently fix the content that, according to projectivism, our 
moral judgements and experiences project upon W. (2) The fact F, which, according 
to Korsgaard, is the bedrock upon which moral judgements and experiences make 
sense, can find no room within the bipartite image that projectivism presupposes. For 
it can be interpreted neither as W-fact nor as an H-fact. 
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